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Genuine policy advice from economists often collides with political reality, leading to a 
failure of implementing first-best solutions. Economic debates usually involve what constitutes 
good economic policy, without necessarily taking political constraints into account. During recent 
years, however, there has been the revival of interest in the more practical, but yet equally inspiring 
side of the coin, i.e. the political economy of economic policy. Two much debated books by Drazen 
(2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) reflect a growing emphasis on the political economy
1. One 
of the research areas these studies are concerned with is the political economy of reforms. Specific 
issues this area deals with include: why are reforms delayed?; what determines support for re-
forms?; how can reforms be better implemented?; what is the optimal speed and sequencing of re-
forms?  
Arguably, one of the most far-reaching events in the economic history of the 20
th century 
was the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, and their sub-
sequent transition toward market economies. The economic consequences of the transition process 
have been often severely painful. After the start of the reforms, all countries have experienced a 
major fall in output. A majority of the transition countries have faced a sharp increase in income 
inequality and unemployment. For example, in Russia, output declined by about 40% from 1992 to 
1997, unemployment rose from 4.8% in 1992 to 10.9% in 1997, and income inequality expressed in 
Gini coefficient soared from 26.9 to 48.3. Most of the countries started to grow only towards the 
end of the 1990s. Even now, the sustainability of long-waited economic boom is still questionable 
for Russia.  
One unique feature in transitional countries in former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe 
is that the transition process has involved democratisation as well as marketisation. Almost all 
countries attempted political liberalisation by establishing democracy and civic freedom at the early 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
  2stage of the transition. From the very early on, therefore, all wide-ranging economic reforms must 
have been passing through the political process. As a result of worsening economic well-being at 
least in the early years of transition, there might have been an immediate feedback from economic 
experience to politics in order to block the implementation of radical market reforms, either by ex-
erting political pressure on a reform-oriented government or by reinstating a communist or socialist 
party through an election.  
Policy choices varied markedly across these transition economies. Countries were often 
classified as full (big-bang) reformers or as partial reformers. Policies have been especially distinct 
with respect to austereness of stabilisation, speed and forms of privatisation, and tolerance towards 
rent seeking. This indicates that policy decisions by politicians have not been dictated simply by 
economic circumstances: politics or more specifically mass support has been important for policy 
making.  
The combination of the sudden start of transition, the rapid establishment of democratic in-
stitutions affecting the nature and speed of reforms, and variances in policy choices across the tran-
sition countries provides a unique opportunity, arguably one close to laboratory circumstances, to 
investigate the interaction between political process and economic reforms. In other words, the tran-
sition experience offers an unrivalled opportunity to test the political economy theories of reforms. 
In contrast, in many of the Latin American and east-Asian countries, whose experience has been 
widely used in earlier political economy literature, have a long history of path-dependence of re-
forms. Thus, it might be difficult to distinguish the contemporaneous political feedback to reforms 
from the effect of path-dependency on reforms. Moreover, in most east-Asian countries, economic 
reforms preceded political transformation, suggesting a feedback from economic experience to poli-
tics has been slow and weak.  
The importance of studying the political economy of reforms in transition countries has 
been reflected in a large volume of both theoretical and empirical research. Among these, Blanchard 
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  3(1997) highlights the interactions between macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment and 
budget deficits, and the optimal speed of transition reforms. Roland (2000) focuses on many politi-
cal economy aspects of reform, particularly on how political constraints determine a reform path. 
The growing body of empirical work (see eg Berg et al 1999; Havrylyshyn et al., 1998; Campos and 
Coricelli, 2001), suggests that economic reforms (liberalisation and restructuring), prudent macro-
economic policies (low inflation and small budget deficits) and beneficial initial conditions (rela-
tively small distortions before transition, the experience of pre-transition reforms and beneficial 
geographical location among other things) are the crucial determinants of growth during the transi-
tion. However, existing macro-level empirical studies tend to overlook the interactions between 
economic reforms, political constraints and growth.
2 As a result, many of the recent important theo-
ries have not been tested yet.  
In this paper, we attempt to fill the gap between the key theories of the political economy 
of reforms and empirical research on growth in transition countries. We use a novel data set that 
makes it possible to build a dynamic panel econometric model to test the relationships between pub-
lic support for reforms, progress in reforms, and economic growth. We first examine what deter-
mines support for economic reform among citizens. Our key focus is on how economic outcome 
from earlier reforms and material well-being of individuals, such as growth, inflation, unemploy-
ment, and income inequality, affect support for future reforms. Public support for reform is likely to 
act as either ex ante political constraints (that may block reforms before their being launched) or ex 
post constraints (backslash and policy reversal). Second, we test the extent to which these political 
constraints have exerted influence on the nature of economic policies. This can be viewed as a way 
to study empirically the validity of political economy models of reforms in the transition context. 
The chosen reform may also be related to past macroeconomic outcomes, opening up a way to test 
the endogeneity of policies to economic variables, as highlighted in the literature on the optimal 
speed of reforms such as Blanchard (1997). Third, we examine how reforms affect growth, employ-
                                                 
2 There are studies (Fidrmuc 2000, Jackson et al (2001) and Warner 2001, among others) building on evidence from 
  4ing dynamic panel models that address some of the issues overlooked by the existing literature on 
growth in transition countries. These include treating the three equations of the determinants of 
growth, support for reforms and progress in reforms as a system, and taking account of the dynamic 
nature of transitions using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Our results suggest that support for reform is dependent on the past macroeconomic per-
formance, and especially on developments that directly concern the well-being of people, such as 
unemployment, inflation and income inequality. The support for reform, in turn, is a crucial deter-
minant of a reform path. This finding implies that political constraints have played a key role in 
shaping economic policies in transition countries: transition reforms are not an exogenous process 
but crucially dependent on the political economy considerations. In addition, we find that accumu-
lated reform progress affects economic growth positively, which dominates the negative short-run 
impact of reform on growth.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical research on the political 
economy of transition and earlier empirical work on growth in transition countries. Section 3 pre-
sents the data and our empirical approach. In Sections 4, we present our main results, which are 
checked for their robustness in Section 5. We summarise our main findings in Section 6.  
 
2.   Public support, reform progress and economic growth in transition countries: litera-
ture survey 
 
Political constraint of economic reform and determinants of public support 
In any democratic country, a decision to launch or continue major reforms requires suffi-
cient public support. Emphasising the importance of political constraints in adopting and carrying 
out a reform programme, Drazen (2000, p. 624) claims that the political problem in transition is that 
for a program of reform and transition to succeed, it must have the necessary political support at 
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  5crucial decision stages. Given high uncertainty regarding the success of a reform and a newly cre-
ated democracy, one can argue that political constraints play an extremely important role in policy 
making in transition countries.     
Several studies analysed the role of political constraints on economic reforms. Rodrik 
(1994) argues that the consequences of reform often involve the redistribution of income among 
different groups. Thus economic reforms are not or only gradually implemented unless the effi-
ciency gain from reforms are substantial and income is redistributed in a way that minimises the 
opposition. The probability of voting against reform may increase because of individual uncertainty. 
For example, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) suggest that some of the eventual winners would vote 
against the adoption of an efficiency-gaining reform package because the losers are not identified ex 
ante.  
Ex post political constraints are also analysed in Wyplosz (1993) and Dewatripont and Ro-
land (1995). In more detail, Wyplosz (1993) maintains that the continuation of a reform requires a 
more stringent condition compared to a condition that enables the reform to start. This model as-
sumes the unanimity rule, under which the government concerns with income distribution between 
the losers and winners even though the losers are minority. Dewatripont and Roland (1995) provide 
a model that contains both aggregate and individual uncertainties. Due to aggregate uncertainties, a 
partial reform (defined as implementing part of reforms) might be beneficial for the society, be-
cause of the existence of an early reversal option. Furthermore, sequencing is important: a partial 
reform that increases the welfare of a median voter will lead to the continuation of another reform if 
the aggregate outcome is positive. This suggests that starting with a reform that increases the wel-
fare of a majority runs a smaller risk of reversal.   
If political constraints are important for the start and continuation of a reform, the govern-
ment needs to design mechanisms to compensate the losers. Otherwise, a status-quo bias or a re-
form reversal is likely. During transition, unemployment is likely to increase. In order to reduce the 
blocking of a reform by the unemployed, the government needs to provide unemployment benefits. 
  6In these conditions, Dewatripont and Roland (1992) point out that a slower, feasible speed of transi-
tion may be preferable because the pressure on fiscal sector can be lessened. This has an implication 
for the optimal speed of transition. For example, Aghion and Blanchard (1994) highlight the role of 
fiscal balance affected by unemployment benefits in the decision of the speed of reform. If the gov-
ernment adopts a big-bang reform that leads to shedding too many jobs, the fiscal burden becomes 
so large, which will make both the restructured state sector and the private sector unprofitable. This 
suggests that there is an a slower, optimal speed of transition that allows not also for both the state 
and private sectors to operate at positive profitability but also for the government to maintain suffi-
cient public support for the continuation of a reform.  
There are only a few studies that provide empirical evidence on whether political con-
straints are indeed important in the nature, adoption, and reversal of reforms. Lora (1998) constructs 
reform measures for 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period of 1985-1995, and 
regresses several political and economic variables on the adoption of reforms. The results suggest 
that the adoption of reforms is positively correlated economic crises such as negative GDP growth 
and past inflation.  
Fidrmuc (2000) investigates the political support for reforms in four transition countries by 
looking at the relationship between votes received by different parties (reform support) and eco-
nomic factors. He finds that the support for reformist parties is negatively correlated with unem-
ployment but positively associated with the size of the private sector. These findings indicate that 
the distributional aspect of reform is one of the significant factors to influence the support for re-
form. Using data on four Polish elections, Jackson et al., (2001) support the hypothesis that eco-
nomic factors are important in explaining political support for reforms. According to them, support 
for pro-reform parties significantly depends upon job creation in new firms that replaces job losses 
in former state-owned enterprises. Warner (2001) uses data of Russian regions to looks at the effect 
of reform progress on support for pro-reform parties in December 1995 parliament elections, and 
finds that reforms created a positive feedback to politics rather than backlash against reforms.  
  7  
Reform progress and economic growth 
A large number of studies investigate the relationship between economic reform and eco-
nomic growth.
3 Early studies (De Melo et al., 1996; Fischer et al., 1996) find that an index of re-
form progress, compiled by the World Bank, is positively associated with economic growth. How-
ever, Krueger and Ciolko (1998) criticise such studies by arguing that the measure of reform is sig-
nificantly correlated with the initial condition of reforms such as export share and GNP per capita 
before the start of the transition. They find that initial conditions play a larger role in output per-
formance than reform-related variables that exclude their indirect effects on growth through initial 
conditions. In contrast, Havrylyshyn et al., (1998) suggest that even after controlling initial condi-
tions, a variable relative to the economic reform index is significant. They also show that the short-
term effect of reform on growth may be negative but its long-term effect is sufficiently positive in a 
way that it dominates the short-term loss.  Brunetti et al., (1997) emphasise the importance of insti-
tutions in economic performance: they find that variables such as rule of law and corruption signifi-
cantly affect economic growth in transition countries. Yet, Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000) 
claim that the impact of institutional development on economic growth is statistically significant but 
not overwhelming.  
However, there are important methodological drawbacks in existing empirical studies. 
First, there was an only limited effort to capture the dynamic nature of economic growth. Economic 
growth is a dynamic phenomenon: early positive growth may provide a momentum for further 
growth in later years, by increasing agents’ confidence in the economy, by providing the govern-
ment with more rooms for policy manoeuvre, and by reducing political constraints using larger re-
sources available from positive economic growth. Second, although many variables used as de-
pendent or independent variables are potentially correlated, existing studies tend to pay insufficient 
attention to the issues of endogeneity and multi-collinearity. For example, unobserved shock may 
  8cause the correlation between error-terms and economic growth. In addition, the speed of privatisa-
tion may be correlated with fiscal balance of the economy, while exchange rate regime can be cor-
related with inflation rates.  
Berg et al., (1999) present a partial effort to take above criticisms into account. They in-
clude previous economic growth as regressors for the estimation of current economic growth and 
use IMF targets for macroeconomic variables as a proxy of an index of reform progress in order to 
mitigate the endogeneity problem of the measure of reform progress. They find that although no 
single policy variable is robust enough to exclusion tests, reform-related measures are often signifi-
cant. Yet, one can argue that instrumenting only the reform index and estimating the model using a 
fixed-effects estimator is a partial solution. Furthermore, by including lagged growth variables as 
regressors, it creates another so called Nickell’s bias.  
Let alone methodological problems, literature on economic growth overlooks one poten-
tially important dimension: how reform progress is determined. Theoretical literature, as we re-
viewed earlier, suggests that political constraints should affect the nature and speed of reform. By 
treating reform progress exogenous, earlier literature on economic growth disregards the possibility 
of feedback from economic performance onto reform progress through public support for the re-
form.    
 
3.  Empirical framework and econometric methods 
 
Reform support 
We assume that support for a market-oriented reform is a function of variables that can be 
classified into three groups: income distribution, macroeconomic performance, and time-invariant 
fixed effects. We include income inequality and unemployment as income distribution-related vari-
ables, in order to use them as a proxy of ex post political constraints. The importance of the two 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 Harvylyshyn et al., (1998) and Campos and Coricelli (2001) provide a survey of empirical studies on economic 
  9variables in explaining support for reform was extensively discussed in several studies (Dewatripont 
and Roland, 1992; Wyplosz, 1993; Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Fidrmuc, 2000). Inflation and 
economic growth rates, which represent macroeconomic performance, are likely but not exclusively 
to affect the whole population in a way that it affects the mean of public support. The variables re-
lating to the third group include all fixed effects including initial conditions and institutions. It is 
likely that ideological and other country-specific unobserved characteristics affect support for re-
form, but we believe that these are captured to a great extent by country-specific fixed effects. 
Therefore, we estimate the following equation: 
  




































where subscripts i and t denote country and year, respectively, reformit is support for reform toward 
a market economy, unempit denotes unemployment rates, giniit is gini coefficients, growit is growth 
rates of GDP, and linflait denotes log of inflation rates in country.  
The dependent variable, reform, is based on information from the Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer (CEEB) surveys, which were commissioned by the European Union and had been 
conducted from 1990 to 1997.
4 The sources for other variables are official statistics from the IMF 
and the EBRD. The countries we are concerned with are Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
The CEEB surveys are annual surveys, which have been monitoring economic and politi-
cal changes, and attitudes towards Europe and the European Union. The regular CEEB sample size 
is about 1,000 respondents per country. The dependent variable, reform, is measured by subtracting 
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4 The samples are drawn among the citizens of the respective country, of 15 years and over. Respondents are inter-
viewed face-to-face, in their private residences. A multi-stage random probability sample design has been applied for all 
countries (except Hungary which adopted a quota sampling technique for survey 2). The details of the surveys and 
questionnaire can be obtained from http://www.social-science-gesis.de/en/data_service/eurobarometer/ceeb/.  
  10the share of respondents who answered “wrong” from that of those who replied “right” to the fol-
lowing question: 
Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is, one largely free 
from the state control, is right or wrong for (our country’s) future?   
Note that we specify a dynamic model by including the lagged dependent variable. Following a 
general to specific approach, we test the dynamic model including all the lagged variables and then 
present a parsimonious model after deleting insignificant variables. We first estimate Equation (1) 
using a fixed effects model, which eliminates country-specific time invariant variables. Next we use 
GMM model to take account of measurement errors in variables and possible endogeneity biases.  
We test ex ante political constraints in contrast with ex post political constraints. Equation 
(1) assumes that public support for a market reform is affected by past and current economic vari-
ables that might determine the winning or loss of an individual. Yet, one can claim that future prob-
ability of winning or loss is also important. These ex ante political constraints are tested using the 
data from the CEEB surveys. The surveys ask a question: 
Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will 
(get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, and get a lot worse)?    
The respondent was asked to choose one of the five options. We measure the variable relative per-
ceived future winning/loss by: first, summing the share of respondents who answered their situation 
will get a lot better and that of those who said a little better, second, summing the share of respon-
dents who answered their situation will get a little worse and that of those who said a lot worse, and 
third, we divide the former share by the latter share.   
In a similar way, we can directly use the data on ones’ perceived financial situations during 
past twelve months, as another proxy of ex post constraint. The question is: 
Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the financial situation of your household 
has (got a lot better, got a little better, stayed the same, got a little worse, and got a lot 
worse)? 
  11  



































1 inf  (1)’ 
where, futlossit is the perceived winning/loss in coming twelve months, measured as explained 
above, and retlossit is the perceived winning/loss in the past twelve months.  
We estimate the equation (1)’ to check robustness of our first step baseline equation (1). In 
particular, the significance of retloss together with the other income-distribution related variables 
indicate that retloss has independent information that is not captured by gini or unemp.    
 
Progress in reform     
The government is assumed to take into account two factors when it designs, adopts and imple-
ments a reform: support from the mass public for a market-oriented reform and macroeconomic 
performance. The former is straightforward to interpret: without a sufficient support from the pub-
lic, it would be difficult for the government to carry out reform policies.  
Macroeconomic performance can also affect reform progress directly because it might ease 
resource constraints faced by the government. For example, too high unemployment rates may af-
fect reform progress not only indirectly through public’s support for a reform but also directly 
through needed spending on social safety net. Government fiscal balance can also play a role in 
reform progress. For a government that suffers from a high fiscal deficit would it be difficult to pur-
sue policy leading to increases in government expenditure: for example, policy aiming at rapid re-
structuring may result in increases in government expenditure.  
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  12where, as the same in equation (1), i and t denote a country and year, respectively. li is the measure 
of reform progress, and gbal denotes the share of government budget balance in proportion to GDP.  
For the dependent variable, the measure of reform progress, we use a structural reform in-
dex that represents the level of structural reforms achieved in each year. The index was compiled by 
the World Bank and has been used in several papers as a proxy of a reform progress (De Melo, et 
al., 1996; Fischer et al., 1998; Berg, et al., 1999).
5 In order to take endogeneity of reform progress 
into account, we employ a two-step approach to estimate equation (2): first, we estimate equation 
(1); second, we replacing support for reform in the current period (reformit) with predicted one from 
equation (1). As in the estimation of equation (1), we use both fixed effects model and GMM to 
estimate equation (2).    
 
Economic growth 
Existing work on the determinants of economic growth in transition countries suggests 
there are four groups of variables that determine economic growth: progress in structural reform; 
macroeconomic policies; initial conditions; institutions. We follow their approach by including the 
key set of variables from these studies, namely, by incorporating determinants relating to reform 
progress and macroeconomic policies, but by treating variables relating to initial conditions and 
institutions as country-specific fixed effects.  
However, our analysis differs from most of the earlier growth literature in the transition 
context by using the predicted index of reform progress (from step 2 regressions) instead of assum-
ing that progress in reforms is completely exogenous. In addition, we use a dynamic specification 
using the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator for dynamic panels. 
Most of the earlier studies emphasise that reforms may undermine growth in short term, 
but their beneficial long-term effect dominates, and therefore the overall relation between reforms 
and growth is positive. A short-cut way to capture this in a short panel such as ours is to include 
  13both contemporaneous reform index and lagged cumulative reform index as right-hand side vari-
ables. The prediction is then that contemporaneous reform may have a negative sign, whereas 
lagged cumulative reform should clearly have a positive impact on growth.  



























− − −  (3) 
where, subscripts i and t denote a country and year, respectively. cli is accumulated progress in re-
form, measured by the sum of reform index, exch is a dummy that refers to whether a country 
adopts fixed exchange rate regime (=1) or not (=0), and capf denotes index of fixed capital forma-
tion. Although capital formation is not used in other studies on growth determinants in transition 




4. Econometric  results 
 
What determines support for reform? 
In the first step of our empirical analysis, we examine the determinants of support of re-
forms (equation (1) above). These results are reported in Table 1. The basic results are obtained 
from models 1 (general) and 2 (parsimonious)
7 that are based on a fixed effects estimator.  
The results (especially from model 2) suggest that both increase in lagged unemployment 
and lagged inflation reduce support for reforms. This confirms that there is a feedback from actual 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 This index is a weighted average of three indices: price liberalisation and competition, trade and foreign exchange 
regime, and privatisation and banking reform. For a detailed discussion on this measure, see de Melo et al., (1996). 
6 Data on economic growth, inflation rates, unemployment rates, exchange rate regime, fixed capital investment, gov-
ernment budget balance are from EBRD Transition Reports (various issues) and the World Bank data base. The source 
of gini coefficient is the United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research (the data 
can be downloaded from http://www.wider.unu.edu/). 
7 As elsewhere in the paper, all the parsimonious models are obtained by dropping insignificant variables one by one 
from the general model. 
  14economic performance to public opinion on the reforms. In addition, increasing economic inequal-
ity (measured by Gini-coefficients) reduces the support for reforms. One explanation for the role of 
inflation is linked to wage and pension rigidities, implying that nominal price increases also reduce 
real income. Inflation may also have adverse distributional implications and may therefore be an-
other proxy of inequality. It is also of interest to note that growth rates (on which most of the eco-
nomic policy focuses) do not affect people’s opinion about the benefits of reform. 
In addition to the fixed effect regressions, we use GMM estimation to control for possible 
measurement errors in support for reforms. Lagged dependent variables turned out to be insignifi-
cant and therefore the results are based on static GMM estimation. Results from GMM regressions 
(models 3 and 4) confirm the overall picture depicted above. The tests reported do not reveal any 
problems in the specifications. Unemployment and Gini-coefficients are still clearly significant, 
whereas inflation is somewhat less significant.  
 
What is the interaction between support for reforms, macroeconomic performance and 
chosen economic reforms? 
Step 2 regressions examine how chosen economic reforms (measured by the World Bank 
aggregate liberalisation index, li) depend on support for reforms and past macroeconomic perform-
ance. This analysis corresponds to equation (2) in section 3. Two linkages are of key interest: politi-
cal economy factors
8 and optimal speed of transition considerations.  
These linkages are tested using a host of econometric specifications. Models 1 and 2 are 
based on two-step least squares (2SLS) estimation, where support for reform is first predicted from 
step 1 regression and then used as a determinant of chosen reform.
9 The third model is similar to 
model 2, but standard errors are bootstrapped to check if inference remains the same as in the stan-
dard 2SLS with predicted reform. In models 1-3, contemporaneous macro-variables are dropped 
from the model to ensure that results do not suffer from endogeneity bias. A possible time lag be-
  15tween the implementation of economic policy and changes in economic performance can also moti-
vate this choice. Finally, GMM is used to allow for the inclusion of contemporaneous variables. 
Dynamic specification was first used (Arellano-Bond one-step estimation with robust standard er-
rors), but as the lagged dependent variable turned out to be insignificant, the reported results are 
based on static GMM. Specification tests do not detect problems in the GMM models. 
Results are shown in table 2. The main finding is that the predicted support for reform is 
significant for explaining progress in reforms. In other words, the probability of carrying our reform 
continuously is positively associated with public support for reforms.
10 Likewise, if unsuccessful 
outcomes of earlier reforms undermine political support for reforms, future reforms would slow 
down. This provides empirical evidence that political constraints are an important consideration 
when politicians decide on the nature and speed of economic reforms. While intuitively clear, the 
finding is important in that it provides empirical evidence for the political economy models of tran-
sition.  
Another interesting finding is related to the role of unemployment. High unemployment 
significantly reduces the pace of chosen reforms. This may be interpreted in the spirit of the 
Aghion-Blanchard (1994) transition model, where the optimal speed of transition is slower because 
of the effect of unemployment on a fiscal balance.
11  
Finally, results from the GMM estimation (models 4 and 5) complement the picture given 
above, although these results must be interpreted with caution because of the small sample size. 
Support for reform is still significant, whereas unemployment is not. It can be explained that the 
some of the effects of unemployment are channelled through the inclusion of contemporaneous fis-
cal balance. Higher unemployment is reflected in a worse fiscal position, and therefore there should 
                                                                                                                                                                  
8 At this stage, the analysis is related to ex post political constraints. Ex ante constraints are analysed in section 5.  
9 Model 2 is similar to 1 with the exception that lagged fiscal balance (gbal1) and lagged reform are dropped. 
10 reform variable is significant in all other specifications except 1 (lagged reform and gbal1 may cause this) and 5 
(which is the general specification of GMM). Reform variable is again significant in the final parsimonious GMM 
model, 6.  
11 Although in their model the relationship between unemployment and optimal speed of reform is non-linear in a sense 
that small levels of unemployment are useful for reforms. Therefore a more correct test for this theory would use a non-
linear empirical specification as well. 
  16be a positive correlation between fiscal balance and reform progress. If a budget balance becomes 
more positive, beneficial reforms that are constrained by fiscal considerations can be implemented 




The final step is to examine how progress in reforms and other factors explain economic 
growth (corresponding to equation (3) in Section 3). Results reported in Table 3 reveal that lagged 
growth is clearly significant. The results also confirm the discussion above that in the short term, 
predicted reform has a negative sign, but lagged cumulative reform is a quantitatively larger posi-
tive factor and also statistically more significant. In model 1 (without exchange rate), high inflation 
undermines growth, whereas inflation is not precisely determined, if exchange rate regime is in-
cluded (model 2). This suggests that fixed exchange rates have successfully curbed inflation in tran-
sition countries during the years this study considers. In addition, our analysis confirms earlier find-
ings on the positive impact of prudent fiscal policy on growth. Turning on the role of investment, it 
is somewhat surprising that the contemporaneous capital formation has a positive sign whereas its 
lagged impact is negative.  
 
  Economic significance 
  First, we divided the countries into four groups in terms of their order in Gini coefficient 
and unemployment rates: the lowest, low, high and highest. The number of countries belonging to 
the lowest, low, high and highest was three, four, four and five, respectively. In order to understand 
the magnitude involved in our key results, suppose that a country was able to reduce Gini coeffi-
cients and unemployment rates by 6.6 and 3.4%, respectively. These changes are equivalent to those 
from the mean of low Gini coefficient to the mean of the lowest Gini coefficient group, and from 
the mean of low unemployment rates to the mean of lowest unemployment groups, respectively. 
                                                 
12 Dewatripont and Roland (1992) build a model where there is a trade-off between budget balance and chosen reforms. 
  17Since the coefficient on Gini and lagged Gini in the regression of support for reform is –0.9 and –
0.97 as shown table 1, column 4, respectively, the aggregate impact of changes in Gini on support 
for reform is 12.4. This will lead to an increase in reform progress by 0.052, because the coefficient 
on support for reform for the estimation of progress in reform is 0.0042 as shown in table 2, column 
2. In the estimation of economic growth, two independent variables are constructed based on pro-
gress in reform. One is progress in reform itself in a corresponding year and another is accumulated 
progress in reform. Respective coefficients on accumulated reform and progress reform, which are 
9.0 and –0.85 as depicted in table 3, column 2, suggest that an increase in Gini by 6.6 induces a rise 
in growth rate by 0.43%. In the same way, a decrease in lagged unemployment by 3.4% results in a 
rise in a growth rate by 0.28%. In other words, such reductions in income inequality and unem-
ployment rates would increase economic growth rates by around 0.7% per annum. Since the differ-
ence in the mean of annual growth rates between fast growers and fastest growers is 3.2%, the com-
bined impact of Gini and unemployment accounts for 22% of differences in annual growth rates 
between the two groups. If we assume a more extreme case in which the mean of the highest Gini 
coefficients groups changes to the lowest and, at the same time, the mean of the highest unemploy-
ment rates changes to the lowest, it will increase annual growth rates by 1.9%. 
  To be more illustrative, suppose that Russia reduced income inequality to the level of Po-
land, namely from 40.4 to 27.4. This will lead to an increase in growth rate by 0.85%. In a similar 
way, assume that Hungary was able to decrease the mean of unemployment rates from 1990 to 1997 
to that of the Czech Republic in the same period, that is, from 9.4% to 3.2%. This will induce an 
increase in annual growth rates by 0.51% ceteris paribus, which accounts for about 50% of the dif-




                                                                                                                                                                  
Pirttilä (2001) finds empirical support for this theory. 
  185. Robustness  analysis 
 
The role of ex ante and ex post political constraints 
First, we focus on robustness analysis of equation (1), by estimating its variant (1)', re-
ported in section 3. Equation (1)' includes both retloss (retrospective loss) and futloss (future loss) 
as additional explanatory variables. Then, ex post political constraints are captured either by earlier 
actual macroeconomic performance such as unemp and gini, or reported perceived loss (retloss). 
Yet, the key addition is the inclusion of perceived futloss, which can be interpreted as an ex ante 
political constraint (perceived future worsening in economic position reduces reform support and 
thus reform progress).  
The findings reported in models 1 and 2 in Table 4 reveal that as earlier, increasing eco-
nomic inequality and unemployment reduce support for reform. From the new variables, retloss in 
not significant, implying that ex post political constraints are captured by gini and unemp to a sig-
nificant extent. An interesting result is that futloss is positively correlated with support for reform: 
support for reforms depends both on earlier outcome of the reforms and the perceived future 
losses.
13 In other words, support for reform, which depends both on ex ante and ex post political 
constraints, is needed for carrying out actual reforms.
14 Given the significance of futloss in deter-
mining support for reform, the combined impact of ex ante and ex post political constraints on eco-
nomic growth increases significantly. Based on the assumption of changes from the mean of low 
Gini coefficient to the mean of the lowest Gini coefficient group and from the mean of low futloss 
to the mean of lowest futloss groups, a rise in public support for reform either by decreasing Gini 
and unemployment, or by increasing the share of people who view their financial situations more 
positively out of total population, results in a faster economic growth by 0.7% per annum. If we add 
this to the impact of unemployment on economic growth through support for reform, based on the 
                                                 
13 We also found that predicted reform that is calculated with the inclusion of futloss is significant in step 2 regression. 
14 These results are not reported here but can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
  19assumption of the change from the mean of low unemployment rates to the lowest unemployment 
rates group, the total effect of political constraints on economic growth is 0.84% per annum.   
 
Different reform indicators 
Let us now turn on some measurement issues in capturing actual reforms (in step 2 regres-
sions). The measure used above, li, is an aggregate of the World Bank liberalisation indices, lii (in-
ternal or price liberalisation), lie (external liberalisation) and lip (private sector entry, capturing e.g. 
privatisation and corporate governance). One can argue that support for reform may vary depending 
on the aspect of reform. To explore this, we used all the three indices separately as dependent vari-
able in step 2 regressions. It turned out that support for reform is not significant in explaining inter-
nal and external liberalisation. This is understandable as most countries launched these reforms in 
the early stage of transition, and thus there is not much scope for (ex post) political constraints to 
affect these choices.  
Models 1 and 2 in table 5 report the results for explaining the private sector entry variable, 
lip. The results show that political support (now lagged) is again significant for this subset of re-
forms. Likewise, unemployment slows down the speed of restructuring and privatisation. These 
results are well in line with the intuition that support for reform is more likely to be a decisive factor 
in planning reforms that directly affect workers' position (whether or not employees are laid off 
because of restructuring). The fact that unemployment influences directly future restructuring is 
consistent with the predictions from the Aghion-Blanchard model. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) produces a wider set of 
reform indicators (that have recently been backdated to cover years before 1995). We constructed 
an average indicator of the following EBRD indices: small scale privatisation, governance and en-
terprise restructuring, competition policy, banking reform, price liberalisation and trade and foreign 
exchange liberalisation. This index, ebrd, depicts the cumulative progress in these areas, and its first 
difference, debrd, is then used as an alternative reform index in step 2 regressions. These results are 
  20covered in models 3 and 4 in table 5. While there are some changes in these results in comparison to 
the main set of results of table 2 above, main key results are fairly robust: even with the EBRD in-
dex, reform support and unemployment retain their signs and remain significant in the parsimonious 
model. 
 
The role of democracy 
The importance of political constraint may vary according to the degree of political free-
dom in a country. We examine this by augmenting the first and second step estimations with data 
from Freedomhouse. Freedomhouse rates all countries according to their political freedom on a 
scale 1-7, where western type of democracies get grade 1 and complete dictatorship get 7. We de-
note this variable by freedom. Based on this index, Freedomhouse classifies countries into 3 groups, 
free, partially free and not free.  
A number of interesting hypotheses arise. Well-established political freedom may reinforce 
support for market reforms. Thus, freedom is included as a determinant of support for reform in step 
1 regressions below. Second, in step 2 regressions, the dependent variable, progress in reforms can 
depend on the degree of political freedom, and the influence of support for reform may hinge on the 
level of democracy. It is possible that political constraints are strongest in politically free countries. 
These hypotheses are tested by including freedom directly into step 2 regressions, and by construct-
ing an interaction variable between freedom and support for reform, i.e., iareform=reform*f. This 
interaction term has positive values only if a country is politically free.  
The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 and columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. For 
brevity, only results based on GMM estimations are reported here.
15 Consider first the results of 
explaining support for reform in Table 4. An increase in the political freedom in the country (a de-
crease in the value of freedom) increases the support for market-oriented reforms. The role of other 
determinants remains the same. Increase in political freedom is also positively correlated with ac-
  21tual progress in reforms (Table 5, column 6). However, the interaction variables (iareform and 
lagged iareform) are not significant in explaining progress in reforms. This suggests that while po-
litically free countries are also likely to become more economically free, the strength of political 
constraints does not vary significantly among politically free and less free countries. One explana-
tion is that most of the countries in the sample have been classified as free or partially free over the 
whole estimation sample. In addition, even in the absence of complete political freedom, country 
leaders may have been dependent on the public opinion through some indirect routes, e.g. through a 




This paper investigates relationships between public support for reform, actual progress in 
reform and economic growth. In order to measure support for a market-oriented reform, we use a 
novel data set from post-communist countries from 1990 to 1997: the Central and Eastern Euro-
barometer surveys.  
We use a fixed effect panel and GMM to estimate three equations taking account of en-
dogeneity of support for reform and actual progress in reform for the determinantion of economic 
grothw. Our results suggest that both ex post and ex ante political constraints influence the extent of 
reform progress in these countries, supporting predictions of key theoretical work on transition eco-
nomics. Public support for reform is positively associated with favourable economic conditions 
affected by earlier reforms and negatively correlated with increases in income inequality and unem-
ployment. In addition, support for reform progress and unemployment affect actual progress in re-
forms, which in turn are associated with economic growth.  In terms of economic significance, our 
results indicate that a decrease in income equality in Russia to the level of income inequality in Po-
land would have increased Russia’s annual growth rates by 0.85%. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 Results from LSDV regressions were qualitatively similar and they can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
  22The analysis highlights that while economic reforms are needed to foster growth, they must 
be designed in such a way that they do not undermine political support for reform. Policies that re-
duce harmful social impacts of economic growth, such as rising inflation, unemployment or income 
inequality – which are important in their own right – also create support for market-oriented re-
forms and should therefore form a crucial element of a successful reform package even from the 
efficiency point of view. 
Due to the paucity of data, our analysis has abstracted from a number of potentially impor-
tant considerations. One concerns the role of international financial institutions. Many of the coun-
tries have followed, at least to some extent, policy advice from institutions such as the IMF, sug-
gesting the chosen reform policies may reflect other considerations other than support among the 
electorate. Furthermore, institutional differences other than the degree of democratic freedom 
(which we did consider) may have interesting implications for political economy linkages. In some 
countries powerful elite groups have arguably been able to influence decision making for rent seek-
ing purposes. In these circumstances, chosen reforms may have again differed from those that 
would have been chosen in an ‘ideal’ democracy. 
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  26Table 1: Determinants of public support for a free market economy 
 
Model 1  2  3  4 





























































        
No. of obs.  67  69  53  55 
R
















Sargan test of 
overidentifica-
tion 








AR(1) test      -1.482 [0.138]  -1.627 [0.104] 
AR(2) test      0.703 [0.482]  0.789 [0.430] 
 
Notes 
This table refers to STEP 1 regressions (dependent variable: support for reform). *, ** and *** de-
note significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t-values are based on robust standard er-
rors and reported in brackets. Results in Column (1) and (2) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. p-





  27Table 2: Determinants of progress in reforms 
 
Model 1  2  3  4  5 







2SLS, std errors 
bootstrapped 
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   -0.0007 
(-0.40) 
 
          
No. of obs.  63  66  66  61  76 
R





    
Wald (joint sig-
nificance) 






















AR(1) test        -0.850 [0.395]  -2.374 [0.018] 
AR(2) test        -1.090 [0.276]  -1.231 [0.218] 
 
Notes: STEP 2 regressions (dependent variable: liberalisation index). *, ** and *** denote signifi-
cance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t-values are based on robust standard errors and re-
ported in brackets. Results in Column (1) and (2) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. p-values are 
indicated in squared brackets. 
  28Table 3: Determinants of economic growth 
 
Model 1  2 

































Exch   2.537* 
(1.86) 
Capf   0.240*** 
(4,68) 
Capf1   -0.195*** 
(-2.73) 
    











AR(1) test  -2.34 [0.0195]  -2.20 [0.0281] 
AR(2) test  0.71 [0.480]  -0.04 [0.971] 
 
Notes 
STEP 3 regressions (dependent variable: growth). *,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. t-values are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets. p-
values are indicated in squared brackets. Table 4: Determinants of public support for a market economy: robustness check  
 
Model 1  2  3  4 
Dependent var.  reform  reform  reform  Reform 
Estimation method  Fixed effects  Fixed effects-
parsimonious  
GMM GMM 

























































   




Freedom1     6.057* 
(1.85) 
 
      
No. of obs.  56  60  53  59 
R














Sargan test of 
overidentification 






AR(1) test      -1.345 [0.179]  -1.628 [0.103] 
AR(2) test      0.691 [0.490]  1.601 [0.109] 
 
Notes 
Alternative STEP 1 regressions. *,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively. t-values are reported in brackets and p-values squared brackets. Results in Columns (1), (2), 
(3) and (4) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent 
var. 
lip lip  debrd  debrd  li  li 
Estimation 
method 
Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
–  
parsimonious 




Variable        
Predicted 
reform 
0.003   
(1.34) 
 0.012   
(1.46) 
   

































































Freedom1       0.0036 
(0.24) 
 
Iareform       -0.0026** 
(-2.43) 
 
Iareform1       -0.0016 
(-1.61) 
 
        
No. of obs.  63  81  63  81  61  70 
R




















Sargan test of 
overidentifi-
cation 

















Alternative STEP 2 regressions. *,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t-values are 
reported in brackets and p-values squared brackets. Results in Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) are corrected for heteroske-
dasticity. 
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